

WORLD BANK AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

Noah Echa Attah
Osun State University
Nigeria
neattah@yahoo.com

Abstract

One of the major challenges of Nigeria, beginning from the second decade of her independence, has been that of agricultural failure. Apart from providing food for the Nigerian population, agriculture had been a major income earner for both the government and the people. The importance of agriculture in the economy was demonstrated in its position as a major foreign exchange earner during colonialism and in the first decade of independence (Bonat, 1989:78; Oladele, 2004:141). Agriculture however began to experience crisis during the second decade of Nigerian independence. This was evidenced in the decline of the contribution of agriculture to Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings and the difficulty in feeding the people. By 1980, agriculture contributed only 2.4% to export earnings (Bonat, 1989:80) and by the beginning of 2000, it contributed about 0.05% to export earnings (USAID, 2008:42).

One of the programmes put in place to solve the crisis in the agricultural sector and to accelerate its growth was the World Bank Agricultural Projects (WBADPs). The programme popularly called ADPs adopted western technology in the agricultural development of Nigeria through farm inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, machineries and chemicals imported from America and Europe. These inputs were meant to revive and enhance agricultural production in Nigeria. The ADPs however appeared to be a conscious programme of the World Bank, which appropriated Nigeria's revenues through the importations of agricultural inputs and services. Similarly, it became avenue for personal accumulation by the local bourgeoisie through contracts and fertilizer distributions. The paper argues that the roles of foreign capital in collusion with the local bourgeoisie under the WBADPs engendered underdevelopment rather than development in the Nigerian agriculture.

(Key Words: Agriculture, World Bank, Agricultural Projects, Foreign Capital, Seeds, Fertilizers)

INTRODUCTION

At independence, Nigeria was still an exporter of primary products. Food was only imported to supplement local production, though emphasis was still on cash crops production – a precipitate of colonial agriculture. Agriculture was predominantly under the control of peasant farmers. The tragedy of the agricultural sector was however that, the essential institutions and exploitation mechanisms of the colonial period were “Nigerianised” and preserved (Lubeck, 1986: 39). The inequalities in resource allocation and the unequal relations between the rural and urban sectors were kept intact; the educational system, which traditionally looked down on agriculture and on farmers was not restructured. The peasants were neither involved in plan initiation nor implementation of agricultural policies, despite the fact that the sector in which they operated was then the mainstay of the economy in terms of foreign exchange earnings and food supplies (Oculli, 1979: 65).

Between 1960 and 1966, agricultural production was relatively stable. But the growth rate of food production started declining in 1967 (Ayida and Onitiri, 1971:92). In the face of these developments, export of agricultural products became a doubtful means of acquiring revenues to maintain the state and the ruling class. By 1975, groundnut, palm produce and cotton exports had ceased, this was followed by timber in 1977 and hides and skins in 1980s. All the agricultural exports took a downward turn after 1970 except cocoa, which remained relatively important. The share of agricultural products in total export value dropped from 32.38% in 1970 to 13.54% in 1973 and dropped to 5.21% in 1975. As mentioned earlier, agriculture contributed only 2.4% to export earnings by 1980 (Bonat, 1989:80).

When agricultural export production began to face serious problems and the Third World food problem had begun, the ruling class accepted the logic of the inflow of massive foreign involvement in Nigeria’s agriculture. The injection of foreign capital and expertise from Western agri-business organizations in collaboration with local

agricultural interests was thus seen as panacea to agricultural problems (Akaahan, and Ngutsav, 2004). There had not been tangible benefit to Nigeria of the \$315.3 million World Bank spent on the projects within five years. The investment had rather led to capital flight to more than \$571.3 million (Oladele, 2004). This also fits into the economic gamut of the West and its multinational corporations who controlled the technology and technical expertise, supplied farm inputs, consulting services, and eventually land and labour.

The government began to embark on programmes to induce both the peasants and non-farmers to take up farming. First was the Accelerated Food Production Programme (AFPP). The World Bank Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) and River Basin Development Authorities (RBDAs) were also established in 1975. In 1976, Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) was launched. In 1979, OFN was replaced with the Green Revolution (GR). The green revolution was designed to coordinate the activities of the ADPs and RBDAs (Akor, 1985). All these were put in place to tackle agricultural crisis in Nigeria. Our focus is, however, on the ADPs.

The Nigerian state in collaboration with multinational corporations through the dictate of the World Bank put in place necessary institutional and organizational safeguards to engender agrarian development, but ended up in effecting capital accumulation for multinational corporations and their Nigerian cronies. Though there is no accurate record for now, for every dollar invested by Western firms, not less than \$1.0 is generated in profits and dividends for the foreign companies (Oladele, 2004). Through Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs), the World Bank appeared to serve the interest of foreign capital instead of reviving Nigerian agriculture (Ogboru, 2002). This study, therefore, delineates the trajectory of the Nigerian agriculture as rooted in the World Bank agricultural development projects and the accentuation of underdevelopment of the sector.

THE WORLD BANK, FOREIGN CAPITAL AND THE STATE

Agricultural Development Projects (ADPS) are World Bank assisted programmes found in many countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa. The basic philosophy of the projects has been the same in all countries, even though emphasis might differ from one country to the other. The ADP model aimed at increasing agricultural production and in

most cases export production through international technology transfer among other packages. One writer has distinguished two types of agricultural development strategies – the “improvement” and the “transformation” methods (Okereke, 1987: 45).

The improvement method simply refers to improving the existing traditional methods of peasant cultivation through simple labour-saving devices – bio-chemical innovations such as insecticides and fertilizers, improved seeds, provision of credit facilities to farmers and extension services to educate farmers on better farming techniques. This strategy seeks to improve the basic structure of peasant agriculture. The Japanese model of agriculture is often cited as a classical example of this strategy (Okoye, 2002: 98).

The transformation method, on the other hand, is based on large-scale cultivation using tractors, irrigation systems, farm settlements and ranching schemes. Large-scale application of capital equipment is assumed to be capable of fostering an efficient farming system. A classical example of this model is perhaps Mexico, where increases in agricultural productivity after World War II derived from few large-scale, capital-intensive and commercialised farms facilitated by the massive infusion of bank loans (Okpanachi, 2004:102). For example, the agricultural development bank, Banrural, accounts for about 45 percent of total lending (MxP366million) to agriculture and was the main source of credit for farmers (Heath, 1990: 89). The agricultural development bank, Banrural (in common with previous state Institutions) waives the collateral requirement and exercises weak sanctions against loan default. This approach may be traced back to the 1926 Act, which first established an Institutional credit facility for farmers (Heath, 1990: 63). The farmer groups that emerged at this time as the primary channels for state credit were essentially created by the government and served to enhance their powerbase in the countryside.

The ADP in Nigeria jointly financed by the World Bank loans, the Federal and State governments, may be said to be somewhere mid-way between the two models. While requiring some foreign technical and financial inputs, it also emphasizes the use of intermediate technology and improvement of existing farming systems (Brett, 1986). Under the circumstance, no government rural development programme can effectively penetrate the thick walls of peasant economy. Given this fact, the continued

independence of the peasants along side capitalist experiment becomes a major threat to rural development programmes (Hyden, 1980:18-19). To develop the rural areas therefore, both the peasants' independence and economy must be eliminated.

Under the ADP, attempts were made to reach and capture the peasants who still basked in the independence of their economy. Peasant farmers were dispossessed of their farmlands, and about 13,000 farm families were left as landless peasants. Economic trees and crops were destroyed in the process with reckless abandon without due compensation and farmers were left helplessly to battle with the problem of hunger, and deprivation (Yahaya, 2002:425). These critical situations resulted in massive uprising and in the process, police and soldiers were drafted to the area where many peasant farmers were attacked and killed and some that were fortunate to be alive were captured and imprisoned (426). According to Beckman (1985) by the end of June, 1980 not less than three hundred and eighty six people have been killed.

It should be noted that attempts were made initially to lure the peasants out of their land and subsistence farming into wage earning in commercial farms, where they could produce cash crops for the industries and exports (Beckman, 1983: 48). This development did not seem to work in favour of agricultural development. The strategy appeared to be mere slogans and arrangements designed to break the defensive walls of the peasant and leaving him exposed to, and unprotected from, the domestic and international predators (Akaahan, and Idris, 2004: 133). Faced with this situation, the peasant invariably withdrew from the projects or at best assumed a wait-and-see attitude to the agricultural development programmes.

The concept of ADP in Nigeria was to deal with agricultural failures such as poor harvests, declining exports and food insecurity based on what was perceived to be the missing components in agricultural development strategy. The project was premised on a combination of factors comprising the right technology, effective extension services, and access to physical inputs, adequate market and other essential infrastructures necessary for improved productivity (Wallace, 1988:54-55). The World Bank sponsored projects were started in 1975 at Gusau, Gombe and Funtua with an initial combined expenditure of N98million (Abdullahi, 1983). The project later covered all the States of the Federation. Table 1 shows some nine agricultural projects as at 1980.

Table 1: ADPs in Nigeria by 1980

Project	State	Area (Km ²)	Estimated No. Of Farming families
Funtua	Kaduna	7,500	88,000
Gusau	Sokoto	4,000	62,000
Gombe	Bauchi	6,450	65,000
Anyigba	Benue	13,150	25,000
Lafia	Plateau	9,400	48,000
Bida	Niger	16,500	24,000
Ilorin	Kwara	11,775	12,000
Oyo North	Oyo	12,300	79,000
Ekiti / Akoko	Ondo	4,950	100,000

Source: Abdullahi, Y.A, The State and Agrarian Crisis

The World Bank in a tri-partite arrangement with the federal and state governments, had majority shareholding, monopoly of management, technical means of production and controlled investment decisions. The Bank's share of funding was 66 percent, the Federal government 20%, while the State governments were 14% (Alabi, 1988:5). The sharing formula clearly concedes management and control of the project to the World Bank.

One important feature of ADP was its integrated approach to the supply of inputs and infrastructures – rural roads, small dams, farm centres, seed multiplication and distribution, tractor hiring units, etc. All these were managed by the World Bank and foreign agri-business concerns. Another central feature of the agricultural strategy was the reliance on the small-scale farmers or peasants as the vehicle for increasing food production. Allied to ADP were agricultural related institutions to facilitate its operations. They include the Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit (FACU), Federal Agricultural Support Units (FASU), Agricultural Projects Monitoring (APM), Agricultural Projects Management Evaluation and Planning Unit (APMEPU), Agro-Industrial Development Scheme (AIDS), Agricultural and Rural Management Training Institute (ARMTI) and the Federal Agricultural Research Agency (FARA) based in London and assisted the Federal Government to recruit staff (Okorie, 1982:77).

The Nigerian state used these institutions to effect the necessary institutional and organizational changes in agriculture to safeguard the investments of agri-business that had cornered the technological and technical expertise, the supply of farm inputs, consultancy services, construction and eventually land and labour. Thus, ADP was a conscious programme of the World Bank to appropriate Nigeria's revenues through the supply of agricultural inputs. For every dollar a United States of America taxpayer pays into the World Bank, about \$1.0 is generated in procurement contracts for USA companies (Dinham and Hines, 1982:18).

According to the World Bank, the agricultural projects were designed to help the small farmers, but the beneficiaries were the local bourgeoisies. For example, there was a deliberate attempt to transform a sector of the local bourgeoisie into large capitalist farmers to effect the necessary capital accumulation through the Land Use Decree. This law vested the ownership of land in the government, which could also approve land for private development up to 500 hectares. These developments led to increasing land values and the Nigerian bourgeoisie began to acquire large tracts of peasant held lands (KSG, 1978). The lands, instead of being committed into arable production, were fenced up by the bourgeoisies who thereafter used them as collateral for agriculture loans, which were used for things other than agriculture.

In the old Benue State, under the Anyigba Agricultural Development Project (AADP), some farmers used the land acquired as collateral for Nigeria Agricultural Cooperative Bank (NACB) loan, only to divert the loan to transportation business ventures, which guaranteed quicker returns than agriculture. In a similar vein, part of the land acquired by General Obasanjo for agriculture is now being used for schools (Bells Secondary School and Bells University of Science and Technology all in Otta). The portion of land committed to agriculture was only used for livestock and pig farming, considered less risky than arable agriculture (Oculli, 1983: 29).

The projects classified the farmers into large-scale, 'progressive' and traditional farmers. Studies show that about 82.5 percent of the traditional farmers were not visited by agricultural extension workers. Ninety-one percent of the farmers who did not benefit from the agricultural development project came from the smallest and poorest category that constituted about 87 percent of the farmers (Nkom, 1981: 67). The large-scale

farmers who were less than 4 percent of the farming population controlled 27 percent of land. The ‘progressive’ farmers who constituted about 9 per cent controlled about 46 percent of the land. The traditional or peasant farmers who constituted about 87 percent were left with only 27 percent of arable land (Nkom, 1981: 43).

Agricultural inputs such as fertilizers were distributed in a way that the so called large-scale farmers got more than the traditional farmers. For example, the local farmers were allocated between three to five bags of fertilizer per year. Twenty bags and above were given to the progressive farmers and the large-scale farmers got one hundred bags and above. The large-scale farmers always had fertilizers reserved for them, which they sold at high prices in the open market (Nkom, 1981: 98). Agricultural projects credit programmes were also skewed in favour of the large-scale farmers. These credits enabled larger farmers to acquire machinery, ox-ploughs, sprayers and vehicles on loan from the projects. The large-scale farmers sold grains to the Grains Boards. Most of the grains sold to the boards were bought from the poor farmers at a very low price due to the latter’s inability to sell directly to the boards. The agricultural projects became avenue for personal accumulation by the local bourgeoisie through contract, fertilizer distribution, etc. Iyayi (1983) estimated that between 1978 and 1982, some members of the political elite stole N6 billion, a considerable part of which came from agriculture.

The average cost of transporting a tonne of fertilizer by rail from Lagos to Kaduna in 1983 was N6.00. During the same period, the cost of transporting a tonne of fertilizer to Kaduna from Lagos using privately-owned trucks was N60.00 (Summonu, 1983). The governments chose to use trucks instead of the rail to transport fertilizers, perhaps to benefit those in power and their cronies who owned trucks. Though there was a massive input per unit in the projects, much of the benefits went to the so-called “progressive farmers” or absentee farmers to the exclusion of the peasants. This has been aptly observed by Williams (1981:25):

There is very little evidence that recent World Bank agricultural projects have benefited the poorest farmers, or have been intended to do so. There is evidence that the benefits have accrued to the rich rather than to the poor and that some projects have excluded the poor from access to productive resources and redistributed assets and incomes the rich. Studies have shown that the projects benefited foreign firms, prosperous

traditional rulers, bureaucrats, top military officials and businessmen who have political contacts rather than the poor local farmers.

From the inception of the projects, foreign agri-business concerns handled the various contracts. The multinational corporations that controlled these projects, supplied all the equipment, fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides and the other inputs, and also handled the designing and construction of project roads and consultancy (Bonat, 1989:80). The agricultural projects appeared to have been designed to enable the multinational corporations to sell their unmarketable products, some of which that had become obsolete. At the same time, the cost of contracts for projects was exorbitant compared with similar projects in other West African countries as shown in the table below.

Table 2: Unit Cost of Project Scheme in West Africa 1977-78

Country	Cost of projects per hectare (₦)
Liberia	250.00
Ivory cost	500.00
Ghana	1,068.00
Nigeria	10,010.00

Source: Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Excessive High Cost of Government Contracts in Nigeria, Lagos, 1981, p.13

The Nigerian state under the administration of General Buhari using the 1978 Land Use Act, (which acquiesced land to the State Governors) invited foreign companies to acquire land, thereby leading to increased land alienation. Breweries and livestock feed companies acquired large tracts of land for the production of sorghum and maize. Furthermore, foreign companies that did not directly control land, advanced capital to the local farmers to produce specific crops. For example, Vegfru turned Zaria area peasants into agricultural serfs who produced tomatoes for its puree factories in Lagos. Similarly, the Nigerian Tobacco Company (NTC) and Philip Morris advanced inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation etc, to farmers in Ogbomosho and Ilorin for the production of tobacco (Agbonifo, 1984:45). These attempts were not translated into agricultural transformation.

There was apathy on the part of the agricultural labourers due to low remuneration and their inability to comprehend the new method of farming. World Bank assistance arrived Nigeria in the forms of fertilizers, machinery and relevant inputs all imported at inflated prices dictated by the supplying firms (Kungwai, 1984:33). Personnel and administrative costs were also enormous. For example, in 1980, the Kaduna State government revealed that N12 million was spent on the World Bank personnel yearly. The World Bank and other foreign projects personnel took away N300.5 million, which was spent on personal emoluments. This implies that the money voted for agriculture directly went to the multinational corporations.

The technology of the World Bank projects was such that the real farmer was alienated from the programme. For example, the World Bank distributed fertilizers and other chemicals and introduced crops, which required such chemicals that the farmers were not familiar with (Musa, 1982:82-85). Agriculture became more unattractive because the prices of fertilizers fluctuated with oil prices, making the peasants to face rising costs. Also, a farmer could lose everything when the harvest failed, whereas a farmer who had invested in a plough could still use it in subsequent years. Farmers could not detect and prevent soil damage resulting from faulty and inappropriate fertilizers.

One of the major challenges in the Nigerian agrarian crisis was the role of the power elite in collusion with foreign capital. The multinational finance capital represented by the World Bank and agri-business monopolies determined the ideology of Nigeria's development. They fashioned the strategies of agricultural development and determined the implementation (Odey, 2004:78). The multinational firms monopolised local assembly of tractors, trucks, agricultural implements, agricultural processing and the production of feeds. The firms also monopolised partnership in crop and livestock production enterprises with governments and private concerns. The Nigerian bourgeoisie operated through the state in partnership with the multinational corporations. On the other hand, the role of the state facilitated the process of capitalist agriculture through the provision of land to the 'progressive' farmers, the control of labour and other institutions necessary for capital accumulation by the local bourgeoisie.

AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS FINANCING

Attempts at solving financing problems of agriculture started in the 1930s, when loans were given to farmers to enhance the production of export crops in northern Nigeria. Other early examples of financial assistance for the purpose of agricultural development were the Nigerian Local Development Board (1946-1949), Western Regional Finance Corporation (1956) and Western Nigeria Agricultural Credit Corporation (1964) among others. On the recommendation of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Agricultural Credit Bank, later renamed Nigeria Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB) was opened in 1973 to provide credit facilities to farmers (Omopariola, 1988:98).

Our concern here is the financing of agriculture under the World Bank development projects. The projects were financed under tripartite arrangement as earlier mentioned. Between 1975 and 1980, a reasonable amount of state capital was invested in the ADPs. The World Bank also spent \$315.3 million on the projects within the same number of years. By the end of 1984, the projects had already gulped a total of N5billion (Abba, *et al.*, 1985). Similarly; private banking capital was also extended to the rural areas for agricultural development.

The funding of agricultural projects came in as loans. Like most official loans, they were from the western capitalist countries and meant for specific projects. The loans were used to purchase goods from the countries providing them. The loans were always channelled through one of the multinational financial institutions, the World Bank, which was usually reimbursed through the state. Such loans were means of maintaining common interest between the ruling elite of the post-colonial state and the imperial forces. The loans were also meant to make the agrarian crisis less abysmal and at the same time reproduced dependency. The motive for financing Nigerian agricultural projects by the World Bank, therefore, appeared to be an investment of the western capitalist countries, as demonstrated in Eugene Black's (cited in Okoli and Gadzama, 1988:127) words:

Foreign aid programmes constitute a distinct benefit to American business. The three major benefits are

- (i). Foreign aid provides a substantial and immediate market for United States of America goods and services
- (ii). Foreign aid stimulates the development of new overseas markets for US companies
- (iii). Foreign aid orients national economies towards a free enterprises system in which U.S firms can prosper.

Though the World Bank claimed that its advice was purely technical, value free and objective, most of its recommendations followed a predictable pattern, which cannot be divorced from the recognizable ideology of the West and the World Bank.

The Bank's emphasis on agricultural development projects could not yield benefits to the poor peasants. In fact, the poor have actually suffered from agricultural projects, financed by the Bank. The loan scheme was such that individual beneficiaries must agree to the terms stipulated. The individual must also provide the security or guarantors. It was in this light that loans were channelled through the NACB who in turn channelled it through the state agency. For example, to qualify for the NACB loan on livestock, clearance must be obtained from Livestock Project Unit (LPU) in case of direct loan while indirect loan required the state government to be the guarantor (Beckman, 1983). It was because of this procedure that most of those who got the livestock loans from NACB in northern Nigeria were members of the *Kungiya Min Yanti Allah* or local bourgeoisie who were able to provide the needed securities.

Loans were usually given as investments on behalf of their guaranteed creditors. Such loans covered only the foreign components of the schemes or projects. Even then, the loans tend to favour the part-time farmers or petty bourgeoisie. Some of the merchants who collected the loans had some big holdings in different locations from the project areas. The positions of these merchants were further reinforced with the coming of the agricultural projects (Agbonifo, 1984:96). With the agricultural projects, new farmers emerged from well placed civil servants and senior army officers. This new group together with the big farmers became willing to be used by the World Bank. These big farmers posed as peasant farmers in collusion with the chiefs or government officials for the loans. In the end, the peasants could not get the loans. The very few peasants who got the loans lacked the capacity to withstand unfavourable price changes. In the circumstance they sold out their stock or paid back loans from which they did not benefit

very much. The contradiction in financing agriculture was aptly demonstrated in the study carried out on most agricultural development projects (Are, 1984).

CONTRADICTIONS OF AGRICULTURAL TRANSFORMATION

The ADPs were designed, according to its authors, to rehabilitate the dwindling production of forest crops, cocoa, rubber and palm produce for export. The projects were equally meant to increase production of food crops for the circumscribed internal markets. In reality these appeared like re-establishing the agricultural economy of the colonial era. In terms of purchases of inputs, institutional provisions and infrastructures for agricultural development, the World Bank in collaboration with the state invested a lot on agriculture. Sadly, the massive investments were not translated into agricultural revolution. Local and foreign contractors and land speculators profited substantially from the establishments of the agricultural projects. Plantations failed to operate profitably. Most of the projects' strategies on settlement schemes and extension services hindered agricultural production. Huge bank loans and subsidies were granted to senior army officers, businessmen and senior civil servants to buy land, fertilizers and tractors and to invest in poultry and livestock, but diverted to less risky business ventures (Williams, 1980:160).

Despite the massive presence of agricultural projects all over the country, there were equally massive importations of large quantities of food. In fact, the importation of food accelerated after the first five years of the ADPs as shown in the table below.

TABLE 3: Food Imports as Proportion of Total Imports 1970-81

Year	Total Imports (₦ million)	Food Imports (₦ million)	Percentage of Food as Total Imports
1970	752.58	57.694	7.67
1971	1,075.07	88.254	8.18
1972	986.22	95.104	9.64
1973	1,220.95	126.260	10.34
1974	1,737.38	154.765	8.96
1975	3,717.38	298.805	8.01
1976	5,132.51	441.846	8.55
1977	7,91.70	781.190	10.38
1978	8,211.70	1,108.660	12.43
1979	6,169.20	1,105.900	16.90
1980	9,095.60	1,480.000	15.60
1981	12,919.60	2,198.3	17.00

Sources: J. F. Alamu, 'The Petroleum Industry and Agricultural Stagnation in Nigeria, Seminar, 1984

Food imports rose from N57,694 million in 1970 to N298.805 million in 1975. By 1981 it had risen to N2,198.3 million. Within the same period, raw materials imports accelerated from N519.3 million in 1974 to N1,094million in 1976 and exceeded N3 billion at the end of 1981 (Ditooh and Akatugba, 1989:366). We have already observed that Nigeria was importing those agricultural raw materials it used to export before the early 1970s. This import scenario took place at a time when there were more investments in agriculture.

The Nigerian comprador bourgeoisie saw the food crisis occasioned by agricultural failure as another avenue to collude with multinational agric-business concerns to make profits through food imports, especially rice. The local bourgeoisie made fantastic profits through re-bagging, transportation and sales of imported foodstuff. During the period of ADPs, rice was imported at the rate of N10 to N15 per 50kg, and sold between N120 to N200 per bag (Ditooh and Akatugba, 1989:366). The importation of foodstuff, which satisfied the urban needs subsequently, destroyed the market for locally produced foodstuff.

Studies of the ADPs since inception showed that productivity in terms of yield per hectare did not seem to have improved. There was a decrease in the hectareage planted and total production between 1971/72 and 198/79. This indicates that the ADPs did not contribute significantly to aggregate production. The contributions of ADPs became even more insignificant when viewed against the expenditure on the projects after five years of the World Bank projects. The expenditure on Funtua ADP was over N38 million, while that of Gusau was over N31million and Gombe ADP was over N27million. These APDs covered only six local government areas in all, which was about 16, 600 square kilometres (Palmer-Jones, 1983:100-108). There were virtually no long-run benefits of the ADPs despite these expenditures, except in the training of indigenous staff, which was even doubtful. For example, it was noted with respect to Gusau ADP that “the performance of the extension service in changing farmers` levels of agricultural knowledge could only be considered very disappointing (Ojogbane, 2003).

Similarly, Idachaba (1986) noted the ADPs were more observed for their colossal waste of natural resources and award of contracts than any notable achievement in agriculture. Despite the disastrous performance of the early ADPs, some states went

ahead to establish ADPs. Except, probably the Oyo North ADP, others, namely Bida, Ilorin and Ekiti/Akoko were abysmal failures. For example Bida ADP targeted to produce 1.6 million metric tones of sorghum, rice and millet annually, but only 1.8 million metric tones were produced in four years.

Projects such as ADPs initiated and executed by foreign capital and based on their felt needs, were neo-colonialist in nature. It is equally inconceivable that management staff, which constituted 80 per cent of the World Bank appointees, would engender autochthonous development. In fact; it is the neo-colonialist nature of ADPs that stifled agricultural transformation. They did not in reality set out to achieve anything; hence nothing was achieved. The ADPs placed emphasis on the provision of improved seeds and crops. However, studies of Anyigba Agricultural Development Project showed that the improved and higher yielding seeds did not get to the majority of the local farmers. For example, improved seeds, such as sorghum, maize, cassava and rice, made available by the Anyigba project and widely consumed locally only got to 6.5 per cent of the farmers (Umeh, 1989). The 'progressive' and large 'scale' farmers constituted about 90 per cent of the people that benefited from the improved seeds.

Growing of crops is a risky business and unless pests and diseases can be controlled, the risk may be too high. Due to the risk of crops and livestock diseases, the ADPs incorporated disease control services in their agronomic packages. Despite over 80 per cent awareness of the availability of this service, only 6.7 per cent benefited from it in the 1985 cropping season (Ahmed, 1987:49). The subsistence farmers for whom the programme was designed were left at the mercy of the various pests and diseases, while the large scale farmers became the main beneficiaries of pest and diseases control services.

The ADPs also ignored, to a large degree, the problems of food processing and storage. In all the ADPs scattered all over the country, there was no evidence of storage facilities and processing industries, which would have resulted in integrated agricultural development (Ortese, (2004:74). Throughout the period of the World Bank agricultural projects, traditional methods of storage held sway. Consequently losses were enormous in addition to low prices to the farmers' products due to lack of storage and processing facilities.

Farm machineries and equipment (tractors) were part of ADPs packages for the purpose of agricultural transformation. However, the sale of tractors at subsidised rates became very costly and expensive to operate, at least for most peasant farmers. Consequently, only about 9.5 percent of farmers could use tractors during the 1985 cropping season (Baba, 1986). Furthermore, apart from the fact that the ADPs' technology was beyond the comprehension of local farmers, tractors could not get to remote farms; hence tractor hiring services were concentrated in farms near roads.

Almost all agrarian reforms in Africa and many parts of the Third World were based on international technology. Apart from the ADPs in pre-war Liberia, other international technology-inspired projects failed woefully. The sugar projects in Nigeria and Ghana as well as the rice schemes in Gambia and Sierra Leone were disasters (Sandbrook, 1985). In fact, the state of agriculture in the Third World and Nigeria in particular was an indication of technological bankruptcy. Most of the imported tractors for the purpose of agricultural development projects were grounded after a few years due to lack of maintenance. The non-availability of spare parts, which were often imported for the tractors, also hindered agricultural production. Today, junks of tractors are scattered all over the country where agricultural projects once operated without evidence of success. For example, dilapidated tractors are all over the former headquarters of Anyigba Agricultural Development Project (AADP) now occupied by the Kogi State University, a testimony of the project's failure.

More importantly, the project failed to ensure proper technological transfer. Also, the state failed to develop appropriate technology that will facilitate agricultural development. The political class and local bourgeoisie were only concerned with how much they could appropriate from the sales of fertilizers, tractors and the inputs in collision with international capital, who were only interested in selling these inputs. Almost everything concerning the project was directed from outside the country to the detriment of agricultural transformation (Ojogbane, 2003:99). It is irreconcilable that even grasses for cattle were imported. This was exemplified in the Gujba beef/cattle production in Borno State, where fodder bank was established. Three species of grass – *stylosanthes*, *andropogon gayus* and *centrosema pubssence* were imported (Ahmed, 1987). The belief that the grasses had higher nutritional content than the local grass made

the project officials believed, much profits could be made from its sale, hence it became a means for profiteering. The fodder banks also depended on imported machines to harvest and process the grass into bales for storage before eventual use.

PEASANTS' SURVIVAL

For the purpose of our study here, peasantry is divided into three distinct groups, namely the rich peasants, traditional farmers and landless peasants. The first class of peasants owned between 5 and 10 hectares of land, some of them in ADP areas and could employ some labour. This class constituted the smallest group of peasants. Some of them could advance into the 'kulak' class, while others may sink into the lower groups. The second class of peasants was the 'traditional farmers', who owned between 0.5 and 4 hectares of land. The traditional farmers' class formed the bulk of the peasantry, in ADP and non-ADP areas. They depended on family members for labour and often rented pieces of land from the 'kulak' class or worked for them in return for food, wages and agricultural inputs (Agbonifo, 1984:103). This class had no access to modern technologies of the ADP apart from fertilizers, which they scarcely got. Attempts to adopt the ADP technologies by some of the peasants always resulted in heavy losses because of the small sizes of land available to them. The third group of peasantry are the landless peasants; some employed on state, multinational and 'kulak' owned farms. They were prone to drifting to the urban areas as *mai guard*, construction workers and sometimes factory workers.

The objective of the various ADPs was to reach and capture the peasants who still basked in their economy. In pursuance of this objective, the peasants were systematically lured out of their land and subsistence farming into wage earning in commercial farms, where they produced not staple food items for domestic consumption, but cash crops for export and industrial use (Abachi and Salamatu, 2004:36). The projects appeared to be pious arrangements designed to break the defensive walls of the peasant and leave him exposed to the unprotected stampede of domestic and international capital. For the peasants, they fared worse after the advent of ADPs. The peasants lost their best land to the projects through dams, canals, roads and farm centres, ranging from 20 – 40 percent of farm areas (Wallace, 1980:45). Cropping schemes could not be met as imports of

maize and rice became cheaper than local production, and had also encouraged consumers to replace the local crops with imported foods, especially rice.

The effect of the projects' programme on land started with its acquisition to construct major earth dams for agricultural purpose. The reservoirs of such dams encroached on peasants' fertile lands and necessitated settlement relocation. For example, Tiga dam on which the Kano agricultural project depended, occupied several hectares of land, and led to the eviction of about 13,000 people from the site (Baba, 1986:66). Beyond dam sites, other policies of the projects' land development had seen more land alienated from indigenous holdings. Land was needed for purposes such as pilot farms, housing accommodation, roads, etc. Thus, the Kadawa pilot scheme of the Kano project gulped within a short time over 700 hectares of land in a densely populated district (Baba, 1986:132). Similarly, some communities in the old Benue State had to give way to the Anyigba Agricultural Development Project's roads and farm schemes.

Studies have shown that there are serious doubts on the effectiveness of land acquisition especially in the more densely populated project areas of Sokoto and Kano, where the bulk of the land had been under indigenous holdings before the advent of the projects. This was demonstrated in the Bakolori project area, where lack of adequate consultations with the indigenous people, haphazard handling of compensation issue and a host of other policy contradictions had engendered violent uprising by farmers in 1980 (Beckman, 1984:98).

Though not all the project areas experienced violent uprisings as witnessed in Bakolori, however they suffered similar fate. The handling of compensation created discontent and difficulties among certain segments of the population. The compensation of N80.00 per acre was too small to enable acquisition of new lands in areas where land was naturally scarce; payments were not even made timely enough to enable farmers participate in the following planting season (Beckman, 1984:72). This had resulted in the use of the compensation for purposes other than farming, thereby aggravating the problems of the peasants and access to new farming land.

The changes in the adoption of new crops and cropping patterns within a wide range of new technological packages and new levels of inputs had had implications on the traditional production system. Unfortunately data on yields for the bulk of the projects

are rather fragmentary and not consistent and reliable. However there were strong indications that results were not commensurate with the projects' inputs and had not brought about improved standard of living for the peasants (Ouoje and Baba, 1987:201). This had even been demonstrated within the more marginal Chad Basin project, where the problem of ecology had contributed significantly to rather low agricultural activities of most of the projects' history (FGN, 1985:38). Yields and total production had been consequently low.

Similar observations were made concerning the Kano project. In 1979, there was concern over shortfalls in the yields on plots after 1000 farmers were absorbed into the project. The trend was attributed to a variety of problems, including late plantings and inefficient inputs delivery systems – a result that has been corroborated by Palmer-Jones' (1983) observations on projects in northern Nigeria. Etuk and Abalu (1982) have similarly undertaken a comparative analysis between potential and actual yields for a period of three years and concluded that on the average, farmers obtained less than half of the potential yields for most of the crops.

The implication of the ADPs' pattern of agricultural development is very clear. Like the situation in Tanzania, the World Bank projects failed to promote the cause of the peasants. In fact, just as the activities of the officials under the Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU) functioned to the detriment of the peasants, so did the Nigerian State (Von Freyhod, 1979:39). The only weapons at the disposal of the peasants were apathy and withdrawal. The activities of the projects demonstrated that the World Bank's involvement in agricultural development was not in the best interest of the peasants. If anything, the projects had functioned in the opposite direction – the alienation of the majority of the peasants, without re-engaging them in ADPs, hence compelling migration to the urban areas for jobs in the factories with its social consequences (Akaahan, and Ngutsav, 2004:98).

CONCLUSION

Studies of Nigeria's agriculture since independence revealed the nexus between economic 'irrational' and primitive accumulation. The ADPs operated to the economic

advantage of multinational corporations and economic aggrandizement of powerful segments of the Nigerian political class. Also, the so called Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) had differential impact on the peasantry, favouring capitalist farmers and few rich peasants at the expense of the mass of the peasantry. These programmes have therefore contributed to the emergence of 'absentee capitalist farmers' from 'above'.

Central to the agrarian crisis was the character of the state. It is not a single matter of finding the most appropriate technological and capital packages with which to rescue the agrarian sector, at the heart of the problem were political question about the commitment of the state and the monopolization of political and economic power for transformation (Brett, 1987). In Nigeria, the role of the state is not only crucial, but contradictory as expressed in the inability of its policies to effect agricultural changes.

The dependence of the country on international capital with the state as 'transmitting line' especially during the oil boom ensured policies, which sacrificed agricultural development to foreign capital were promoted. Capitalist agricultural development in Nigeria had created its own contradictions. Resources and investments in agricultural production have not yielded the needed results; rather they have engendered underdevelopment. All the policies and programmes failed to bring about capitalist agricultural development.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abachi, T. P. and Salamatu, I. I. (2004). "Agricultural Food Supply in Nigeria: 1970-2004" in Oigji, P. (ed), *The Food Basket Myth: Implications for Food Security and Agricultural Policy Reform in Nigeria*, Makurdi, Aboki Publishers

Abdullahi, Y.A. (1983). "The State and Agrarian Crisis; Rhetoric and Substance of Nigeria Agricultural Development Policy" Paper Presented at the National Seminar on the First Four Years of Presidential Administration in Nigeria, 12th –16th December, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria

Agbonifo, P.O. (1984). "Nigeria; Agriculture Under Advanced, Commercial

- Conditions compared with peasant-Based Agriculture” paper presented at the ASUU National Conference on the State of the Nigeria Economy, University of Benin, Benin, 9th –13th April
- Ahmed A. (1987). “An Evaluation of the Socio-Economic Impact of Sokoto State Agricultural and Rural Development Authority” Unpublished Bsc Dissertation, University of Maiduguri
- Akaahan, T. J. and Ngutsav, A. (2004). “Transforming Peasant Agriculture: Panacea for Sustainable Food Production in Ogiiji, P.(ed)...
- Akaahan, T. J and Idris, S. I (2004). “Transforming Peasant Agriculture: The Way Forward” in Ogiiji, P (ed) ...
- Akor, M. E. (1985). “The Ironies of Nigeria’s Green Revolution Programme” in Ige, C.S. and Onah, F. E. (eds), *Production in the Nigerian Economy*
- Alabi, J. (1988). “Agricultural and Rural Development Programmes in Nigeria” in Sanda, A.O., (ed), *Corporate Strategy for Agricultural and Rural Development in Nigeria*, Lagos, Les Shyraden, pp.1-22
- Alkassum, A. *et al*, (1988). *The Nigerian Economic Crisis, Causes and Solutions*, Zaria, Gaskiya
- Are, L.A. (1984). “Decade of Agricultural Projects in Nigeria: Implications of Strategies in Fifth Plan, 1986-1990 Paper Presented at a Conference on Strategies for the Fifth National Development plan NISER, Ibadan
- Baba J. M. (1986). Nigeria’s Cardinal Rural Development Strategies and the problem of Rural Inequality: A case Study of the Kano River Project. Paper presented at the Commonwealth Geographical Bureau Workshop on Spatial Inequalities in the Developing World, Bayero University, Kano
- Beckman B. (1983). ‘Public Investment and Agrarian Transformation in Nigeria’ Centre For Social Economic Research, Zaria Reprint No. 13
- Beckman B. (1984). ‘Bakolori: Peasants Versus State and Capital; Paper Presented at the Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Seminar, 3rd July
- Bonat, Z. A. (1989) “Agriculture” in M.O Kayode and Usman, Y.B. (eds), *Nigeria since*

- Independence: the First 25 years Vol. 11*, Ibadan: Heinemann, pp.78-89
- Brett, E.A. (1986). "State Power and Economic Inefficiency: Explaining Political Failure in Africa" *IDS Bulletin*, January, Vol.17 No. 3
- Dinham, B. and Hines, C. (1982), *A Study of Agro-Business in Africa*. Reviewed by Ken Laidlaw in *Africa Business* February
- Dittoh, S. and Akatugba, D., (1988). "The Political and Economic of Food Policy" in Sanda, A. O. (ed), *Corporate Strategy for Agricultural and Rural Development in Nigeria*, Lagos, Les Shyraden, pp.3334-342
- Etuk, E.G., and Abalu, G.O.I (1982). "River Basin Development in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Bakolori Project" proceedings of the fourth Afro-Asian Regional Conference, International Commission of Irrigation and Drainage, Lagos
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985), 12th Annual Report, Chad Basin Development Authority, Maiduguri
- Heath J. R., (1990), "Enhancing the Contribution of Land Reform to Mexican Agricultural Development" *The World Bank Working Papers*, No. 285, February
- Hyden, G., (1988). *Beyond Uzamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and An Uncaptured Peasantry*, London: Heinemann
- Idachaba, F. S. (1986). *Rural Development in Nigeria: Foundations of Sustainable Economic Recovery*" Faculty Lecture, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Ife Ile-Ife
- Iyayi, F. (1983), "Corruption as a Method of Primitive Accumulation: Cost and Implication" Paper Presented at the National Seminar on Indiscipline and Corruption in Nigeria, Zaria
- Kaduna State, (1978), Report on the Lands Investigation Commission, VOL. XVI, Land Use Decree, pp.76-106.
- Kungwai, N. (1984). "Crisis within Crisis: Agriculture and the Crisis of Capitalism in Nigeria" Paper Presented at the ASUU National Conference on the State of the Nigerian Economy, 9th –13th April, University of Benin, Benin
- Lubeck, P.M. (1986). (ed) *The African Bourgeoisie and Capitalist Development in Nigeria, Kenya and the Ivory Coast*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner

- Musa, B., (1982). *Struggle for Social and Economic Change*, Zaria: Gaskiya Press
- Nkom, S. A. (1981). "Integrated Rural Development and the Marginalization of Peasantry in Nigeria", Paper Presented at the National Workshop on the Mobilization of Human Resource for National Development, Zaria, 30th March-2nd April
- Oculli, O. (1983). "Drought in Nigeria Agriculture Policy 1960-19, Presented at the National Conference on the State of the Nation: The First Four Year of Presidential Administration in Nigeria, 12th –16th December, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria
- Odey, M.O., (2004). "Alternative Approaches to Food Security Strategies in Nigeria in the New Millennium" in Ogiji, P (ed) ...
- Ogboru, I. (2002), "Agricultural Development Policies in Nigeria: A Critique". *Jos Journal of Economics* Vo. 12, No.1, December
- Ojogbane, V.T (2003). "The Nigerian Food Crisis: A Historical Perspective" *Benue Valley Journal of Humanities*, Vol.5. No.2
- Okereke, O. (1987). *Agrarian Development programmes in African Countries*, UPPSALA: Scandinavia Institute of African Studies, Research Report No. 28.
- Okoli, F. C. (1987). "Rural Development in Nigeria, Another Battleground for Predators"? A Paper Presented at the 4th National Conference of the Nigerian Rural Sociology Association held at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria 17th – 20th May
- Okoli, F. C. and Gadzama M.A. (1988). "Agricultural and Rural Development Programmes in Nigeria" in Sanda, A.O. (ed) *Corporate Strategy for Agricultural and Rural Development in Nigeria*, Lagos, Les Shyrden, pp.123-132
- Okoye, C.O. (2002). "Effective Implementation Strategies for Poverty Reduction Programmes in Nigeria" *International Journal of Continuing Education*, Vol.5, No.1
- Okpanachi, U.M. (2004). Policy Options for Repositioning the Nigerian Agricultural Sector in Ogiji, P. (ed)...
- Oladele, O. I. (2004), "Effects of World Bank Loan Withdrawal on the Performance of Agricultural Extension in Nigeria", *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 13(2), 141–145
- Omopariola, O., (1988). 'Financing Agricultural Development Projects in Nigeria' in Sanda, A.O (ed), *Corporate Strategy for Agricultural and Rural Development in Nigeria*, Lagos, les Shyraden, pp.92.102

- Ortese, P. T (2004). "Food Security: A Requisite for Sustainable Democracy" in Ogiji, P. (ed) ...
- Ouoje, J., and Baba, J. (1988). "The Impact of the Agricultural Development Project on the Quality of Rural Life" ARMTI Seminar Series NO.3 Ilorin
- Palmer-Jones, R. W. (1983). "Mismanaging the Peasants: Some Origin of Low Productivity on Project Schemes in Northern Nigeria" in Adams W. M. and Grove A. T. (eds), *Irrigation in Tropical Africa: Problems and Problem Solving*, Cambridge, University Press, pp.100-113
- Sandbrook, R., (1985). *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- Summonu H. A. (1983). "The Role of Intellectuals in the Nigerian Labour Movement" A Public Lecture, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, 30 October
- Umeh J. C. (1989). 'The Impact of Rural Infrastructures in the Anyigba and Lafia Agricultural Development Projects' Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ibadan, Ibadan
- United States Agency International Development (2008), Nigeria Economic Performance Assessment
- Von Freyhod, M. (1979). *Uzamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of a Socialist Experiment* London: Heinemann, pp.108-119
- Wallace T. (1988). "Planning For Agricultural Development: A Consideration of Some Theoretical and Practical Issues Involved" *The Nigerian Journal Of Public Affairs*, Vol.8, pp.50-65
- Williams G. (1981). "The World Bank and the Peasant Problems" in Heyer *et. al*, (eds) *Rural Development in Tropical Africa*, (London, University Press, pp.22-31
- Yahaya M. K., (2002), "Development and Challenges of Bakolori Irrigation Project in Sokoto State, Nigeria" *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 11(3): 411-430

